Update dependency urllib3 to v2.6.0 [SECURITY] (1.3) - autoclosed #2666
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This PR contains the following updates:
2.5.0->2.6.0>=1.26.17->>=2.6.0urllib3 allows an unbounded number of links in the decompression chain
CVE-2025-66418 / GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53
More information
Details
Impact
urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g.,
Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd).However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data.
Affected usages
Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly.
Remediation
Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, use
preload_content=Falseand ensure thatresp.headers["content-encoding"]contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
urllib3 streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data
CVE-2025-66471 / GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37
More information
Details
Impact
urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once.
When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP
Content-Encodingheader (e.g.,gzip,deflate,br, orzstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation.The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data.
Affected usages
Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources.
stream(),read(amt=256),read1(amt=256),read_chunked(amt=256),readinto(b)are examples ofurllib3.HTTPResponsemethod calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly.Remediation
Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount.
If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the
urllib3[brotli]extra in the patched versions of urllib3.Credits
The issue was reported by @Cycloctane.
Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.
Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
urllib3's request body not stripped after redirect from 303 status changes request method to GET
CVE-2023-45803 / GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4 / PYSEC-2023-212
More information
Details
urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like
POST) toGETas is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:
Affected usages
Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.
Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:
Remediation
You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:
redirects=False.redirects=Falseand handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
CVE-2023-45803 / GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4 / PYSEC-2023-212
More information
Details
urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303 after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like
POST) toGETas is required by HTTP RFCs. Although this behavior is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: 1. Using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) and 2. The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 301, 302, or 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7 and users are advised to update to resolve this issue. Users unable to update should disable redirects for services that aren't expecting to respond with redirects withredirects=Falseand disable automatic redirects withredirects=Falseand handle 301, 302, and 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
urllib3's Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects
CVE-2024-37891 / GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf
More information
Details
When using urllib3's proxy support with
ProxyManager, theProxy-Authorizationheader is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the
Proxy-Authorizationheader even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat theProxy-AuthorizationHTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the
Proxy-Authorizationheader during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the
Proxy-Authorizationheader, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
Proxy-Authorizationheader without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.Remediation
Proxy-Authorizationheader with urllib3'sProxyManager.redirects=Falsewhen sending requests.Proxy-Authorizationheader.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
urllib3 redirects are not disabled when retries are disabled on PoolManager instantiation
CVE-2025-50181 / GHSA-pq67-6m6q-mj2v
More information
Details
urllib3 handles redirects and retries using the same mechanism, which is controlled by the
Retryobject. The most common way to disable redirects is at the request level, as follows:However, it is also possible to disable redirects, for all requests, by instantiating a
PoolManagerand specifyingretriesin a way that disable redirects:However, the
retriesparameter is currently ignored, which means all the above examples don't disable redirects.Affected usages
Passing
retriesonPoolManagerinstantiation to disable redirects or restrict their number.By default, requests and botocore users are not affected.
Impact
Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable.
Remediation
You can remediate this vulnerability with the following steps:
request()level instead of thePoolManager()level.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)
v2.6.0Compare Source
==================
Security
compressed HTTP content ("decompression bombs") leading to excessive resource
consumption even when a small amount of data was requested. Reading small
chunks of compressed data is safer and much more efficient now.
(
GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37>__)virtually unlimited links in the
Content-Encodingheader, potentiallyleading to a denial of service (DoS) attack by exhausting system resources
during decoding. The number of allowed chained encodings is now limited to 5.
(
GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53>__).. caution::
If urllib3 is not installed with the optional
urllib3[brotli]extra, butyour environment contains a Brotli/brotlicffi/brotlipy package anyway, make
sure to upgrade it to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 to
benefit from the security fixes and avoid warnings. Prefer using
urllib3[brotli]to install a compatible Brotli package automatically.If you use custom decompressors, please make sure to update them to
respect the changed API of
urllib3.response.ContentDecoder.Features
HTTPHeaderDictusing bytes keys. (#​3653 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3653>__)HTTPConnection. (#​3666 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3666>__)#​3696 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3696>__)Removals
HTTPResponse.getheaders()method in favor ofHTTPResponse.headers.Removed the
HTTPResponse.getheader(name, default)method in favor ofHTTPResponse.headers.get(name, default). (#​3622 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3622>__)Bugfixes
urllib3.PoolManagerwhen an integer is passedfor the retries parameter. (
#​3649 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3649>__)HTTPConnectionPoolwhen used in Emscripten with no explicit port. (#​3664 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3664>__)SSLKEYLOGFILEwith expandable variables. (#​3700 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3700>__)Misc
zstdextra to installbackports.zstdinstead ofzstandardon Python 3.13 and before. (#​3693 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3693>__)BytesQueueBufferclass. (#​3710 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3710>__)#​3652 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3652>__)#​3638 <https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/3638>__)Configuration
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